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THE GREAT BAILOUT OF 2008-09
Frederick Tung*
My task today is to talk about the financial crisis. I only have a short time
to talk, so rather than try to give you a comprehensive analysis of events, I'm
going to offer some of my own idiosyncratic takes on what has been
happening. In addition, I will introduce my own small reform proposal for
regulating bank risk taking. So, I'll give you a little bit of news, a little bit of
weather, a little bit of everything.
Where are we now? Let us begin with a statement Henry Paulson made six
months ago while Bear Steams was getting bought up by JP Morgan: "I have
great, great confidence in our capital markets and in our financial
institutions." 1 Six months later, things start looking a little more bleak, and
now we are in the business of restoring our financial institutions. That quote
from Paulson came the same week that Lehman Brothers, AIG, Fannie Mae,
and Freddie Mac all went down. So it was kind of a hard week for the
Treasury Secretary. Just earlier this week, the Federal Government agreed to
pump up AIG with an additional $30 billion in taxpayer money right after it
reported literally the biggest quarterly loss in history, a $61.7 billion loss. All
told, the government pumped in hundreds of billions of dollars into our
financial institutions in four separate interventions, including a hundred eighty
billion just to AIG over the past six months.
I would like to discuss four items. First, I want to assess where we are in
the great bailout by recapping some of the highlights over the last year.
Second, I want to look back a little bit and provide my own idiosyncratic
perspective on the causes of our current financial crisis, especially the
question: whose fault is it? That is always a nice, popular topic in the press, in
the blogosphere, and around the water cooler, so we will see if we can point
some fingers at some of the usual suspects. Third, I want to examine subprime

* Robert T. Thompson Professor of Law and Business, Emory University School of Law. This is an
edited transcript of Professor Tung's presentation at the Sixth Annual Emory Bankruptcy Developments
Journal Symposium held on March 5, 2009.
1 Statement of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Mar. 16, 2008. See, e.g., Commentary: White House
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mortgages. This is kind of a pet issue of mine, and I think the idea has been
much maligned in the press, as well as by some judges and academics. I want
to make the claim that the subprime mortgage was at least a plausible idea at
one time. Finally, I want to look ahead, see where we are going, make some
predictions, and suggest a regulatory project for the future that I call "bonding
bankers."

I. THE EcONOMIc

BAILOUT

OF 2008-2009

First of all, let me just give some of the highlights from the Great Bailout
of 2008-09. We started circling the drain about a year ago when Bear Stearns
was bought by JP Morgan in 2008, with the Feds coming in to facilitate that
deal with a line of credit for JP Morgan Chase. After that, all was quiet for six
months until one really bad week in September. On September 7, the
government took over Fannie Mae. On September 15, Lehman Brothers filed
for bankruptcy. One important consequence was that it left a lot of U.S. hedge
funds in the lurch. They had signficant funds tied up in Lehman Brothers'
U.K. unit. Apparently, U.S. hedge funds were using Lehman Brothers' U.K.
unit as their prime brokerage-their institutional broker-to take advantage of
more lenient margin rules. When the British insolvency administrator took
over Lehman, the hedge funds saw their assets frozen, leaving them in the
precarious position of not being able to honor share redemptions or otherwise
operate. The case has turned out to be a pretty complicated one. If you have
been following the press, you know that Alvarez & Marsal, which is running
Lehman's restructuring, has just earned a $30 million fee for about two-and-ahalf months of work-a pretty good gig if you can get it.
Later that week, on September 16, the Federal Reserve took control of
AIG. At the time, the Fed put in $85 billion and took an eighty percent equity
stake in AIG. As noted earlier, the government's stake in AIG is now up to
$180 billion in total.
On October 3, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
("EESA"). It earmarked $700 billion to buy bad assets from financial
institutions. The idea sounded good: let's take these bad assets off the books
of the banks; let's buy their mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, If we
clean up the banks' balance sheets and make them transparent, then we will
inspire confidence in our banking system. Immediately after passage of the
Act, Henry Paulson announced the Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") a
plan to spend the first $350 billion of emergency funds, and world stock
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markets took a big dive because nobody was excited about the program. At the
time, the program offered no fix for a major valuation problem: how we are
going to value the assets on banks' balance sheets? If we value them at their
market value, it might turn out that the banks are insolvent, and that is not a
good thing. But if the government overpays for the assets, that presents
political perils because the government has then spent too much taxpayer
money. So the market didn't like the plan. A week later, Paulson shifted gears
and announced that the government would no longer be buying troubled assets.
Instead, it would take direct equity stakes in the banks. So Paulson put
together his own capital purchase program, instead of troubled asset relief with
TARP. Under the new program, the government gets preferred stock for the
money it is putting into these financial institutions.
Finally comes February. Just a few weeks ago, the new treasury secretary,
Timothy Geithner, announced a plan for TARP H, which we are now going to
call "FSP": the Financial Stability Plan-a plan to spend the second half of that
EESA money. Under FSP, we have a capital assistance program to purchase
convertible preferred stock from the banks. We have a stress test for banks.
We also have some troubled asset relief as well as mortgage relief. The basic
idea of the stress test is to take the biggest bank holding companies and
investigate to see how their capital will hold up in various economic scenarios
with troubled asset relief. As far as the troubled asset relief itself, the
government is trying to put together public-private partnerships-publicly
subsidized funds run by private fund managers-to try to create some kind of
market for these toxic assets. Again, we are probably going to run into some
valuation questions. If the sale of banks' bad assets results in significantly
lower valuations for those assets than is currently reflected on banks' books, it
might show the banks to be insolvent. If so, then the banks cannot sell, and we
are going to have the same problem we ran up against with TARP I. In terms
of mortgage relief, the Treasury has earmarked $50 billion to reduce monthly
mortgage payments, primarily through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loan
modifications.
Just a few days ago, Geithner announced TALFthe
"Troubled Assets Loan Facility"-a $200 billion loan facility to help big
investors buy more asset-backed securities. The idea here is to jump start
consumer lending and SBA lending by buying up asset-backed securitiessecurities backed by car loans, credit card receivables, and the like.
As of today, that's where are, and where we've been over the last year.
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II. WHO'S TO BLAME?

I want to go back now and take a broader look at where we have been, in
order to address a question on everyone's mind: whose fault is this? It's fun to
speculate, it's fun to point fingers, and everyone has a favorite perpetrator. So
let me run through the usual suspects, and I will give my own take on who we
ought to blame.
What about subprime mortgages, an obvious culprit?
There was
irresponsible lending going on. There was fraud on the part of homebuyers.
There was fraud on the part of lenders. There was fraud on the part of
appraisers. So the subprime mortgage process looks kind of suspect in any
event. What about the greedy bankers on Wall Street? When they were selling
these asset-backed securities they did bad diligence, they had sloppy models,
and they helped get us into this mess. What about the rating agencies? They
were conflicted. They were being paid by the issuers they were rating. What
about deregulation? We never got around to regulating hedge funds or private
equity finds. At the same time, there are all kinds of opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage. Regulation of the financial system is fragmented with
overlaps and gaps in regulatory responsibilities. What about Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac? They subsidized risky subprime lending by buying bad loans off
the books of subprime lenders. In addition, they fought Congress when it came
time to think about tougher lending standards.
That's probably a pretty broad set of the usual suspects, and they all
probably played some role. But in isolation, each played what I view to be a
relatively small role. In addition, some of this stuff is just not new. Many of
these issues we have always had in our financial system.
Let's think about subprime mortgages. They are probably like laws and
sausages: you don't want to look too carefully into how they are made because
it's probably an ugly process. But at the same time, the dollar value of
subprime mortgages is actually relatively small compared to the overall U.S.
mortgage market; even smaller when compared to the overall housing value in
the United States a few years ago; and even smaller again when compared to
the size of the U.S. economy. So by itself, the problem of subprime mortgages
probably was not big enough to cause the collapse of the economy.
What about greedy investment bankers? We do have all these problems
with diligence on asset-backed securities. On the other hand, greedy bankers
have been with us for a long time. That's not a new thing, and to some extent
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we depend on greedy bankers to help drive the banking industry. What about
conflicts of interest among rating agencies? They have for a while now been
paid by the issuers of the rated debt, so again this is not a new thing.
What about deregulation? Trying to regulate the hedge funds as hedge
funds is a bit of a tricky business. By that, I mean, not trying to regulate the
transactions they were involved in or the securities they were buying, but
regulating them as investment entities. The only agency that was interested in
trying to regulate them was the SEC, but the SEC's primary focus is on
investor protection. So think about the kinds of institutions that get broad SEC
oversight: institutions involving large numbers of investors, some of whom
might not be sophisticated. It's that kind of entity that the SEC generally
regulates. So think about public companies. Think about mutual funds.
Hedge fund investors didn't think they needed or wanted this kind of
regulatory oversight. Even now, it's really a question of systemic risk, which
is really within the purview of the Federal Reserve and the bank regulatory
agencies. So, if it is systemic risk we are worried about with hedge funds, the
SEC is probably not the right agency for the job.
What about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? Well nobody disagrees that
they had some role to play in encouraging risky lending because they were
buying some risky loans from originators. But Fannie and Freddie weren't
really involved with the really ugly stuff, and the magnitude of their
involvement doesn't suggest that they could have caused the mess that we're in
by themselves.
So, those are the usual suspects, and I claim they don't tell the whole story.
If it's not their fault, then whose fault is it? Here's my pick. Does anybody
recognize this picture? [referring to slide depicting National Weather Service
satellite photo of weather system]. There is no reason that you should, so I'm
going to let you off the hook. This is actually a national weather service
satellite photograph of . . . the perfect storm. This is the photo of the 1991
Halloween storm that sank the Andrea Gail, which turned into the best-selling
novel, which turned into the George Clooney movie we've all heard about. I
think that the meltdown was driven in some part by all the usual suspects that
we talk about, and at the same time, it was largely enabled by one major
environmental factor: excess liquidity. The world has been awash with cash
the last few years. We have all kinds of huge pools of cash chasing high-yield
returns. So it's not that Wall Street isn't greedy, but I-bankers are just out
there filling this incredible demand for high-yielding investment products.
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So where does this liquidity come from? Well at least a couple of sources.
For a long time, from 2001 until about the middle of 2004, the Federal Reserve
kept interest rates artificially low in the United States. After September 11,
2001, and after the dot-coin bust, the Feds kept interest rates low to keep the
economy chugging along. But the rates were so low that at some points during
that period they were actually negative in inflation-adjusted terms, and that's
one source of all this liquidity that we're seeing. I think it's also fair to say
that some of the excess liquidity is a product of the success of the global
financial system. We've got better technology, we had lowered the barriers to
capital mobility, and, as a result, it's now much easier on a global basis to
aggregate capital. We have these huge pools of cash out there looking for
investments. We have sovereign wealth funds. We have private funds. We
have financial institutions that are all out there hunting for high yields. This
global quest for returns, I think, helped drive the creation of fancy derivative
products and asset-backed products to meet this unquenchable demand for
investments.
III.

SUBPRIME MORTGAGES

Let us now turn to subprime mortgages-a little pet issue of mine. I think
at the time the idea of subprime lending came up, it was actually a pretty good
one, and it is only in the context of all these other factors that subprime
mortgages became "ground zero" for the financial crisis. Excess liquidity and
rampant securitization allowed the subprime mortgage idea to go off the rails.
At least initially, I think it was a plausible idea. Let's try to remember how
this came about and what we were after. We were trying to extend the benefits
of homeownership to risky borrowers. Who are these borrowers? They are
low-income households, they have no down payment funds, they have bad
credit history, and they cannot document their income.
So how do we get them into houses? Well, the strategy was to design a
mortgage for riskier borrowers that would also protect lenders. So a short-term
mortgage was created that really depended on refinancing in order to work for
everyone, which in turn largely depended on appreciation in home prices. So,
we got these "2/28" and "3/27" Adjustable-Rate Mortgages ("ARMs"). In a
2/28, for example, the interest rate for the first two years is fixed, and the
interest rate for the remaining twenty-eight years varies. Nominally, this looks
like a thirty-year home loan, but in fact, it is really only a short-term loan
because the reset rate on the variable part of the mortgage is pretty high. The
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reset rate is so high that it's not very attractive. Note also that this is not a
feature solely of subprime mortgages; prime five-year or ten-year ARMS are
similarly structured. I have a ten-year ARM on my house now, and I fully
expect that as the 10-year fixed rate period comes to an end, I will look to
refinance. So this feature of relatively unattractive reset rates is not unique to
subprime mortgage.
What this structuring does effectively is to make a nominal thirty-year loan
the practical equivalent of a shorter-term loan for the bank, which is a much
lower risk for the bank. Subprime loans really are two- and three-year loans.
They look like thirty-year loans, but, in fact, they are really short-term loans
that give the lender an option to refinance. They reduce the risk for the lender
because every two to three years, the lender gets to take a second look at the
borrower.
Maybe the borrower's financial condition has improved or
deteriorated. Maybe the house's value has appreciated. This gives the lender
the option to make a new credit decision every two to three years, thereby
reducing the lender's risk. And if the house has appreciated or the borrower's
financial picture has improved in the interim, the lender refinances and
everyone is happy.
The subprime mortgage idea actually worked fine for about eight or nine
years. From 1998 to 2006, home price appreciation and short-term financing
worked just as planned. Beginning in 2006, however, the wheels started
coming off. Home price appreciation peaked in 2006 and declined so steeply
that by the third quarter of 2007 there was negative appreciation. Houses are
losing value in 2007. This timing is not so good because we were just hitting
the peak of subprime lending. During 2005 and 2006, subprime lending
peaked, accounting for twenty-five percent of U.S. mortgage loans. And there
are actually a lot of dollars at stake. Originations hit a peak in 2005 at $625
billion. In 2006, the dollar amount of outstanding subprime mortgage debt
peaked at over $1.2 trillion.
While that's a lot of dollars outstanding, let's put that in perspective. As
earlier noted, subprime debt is a relatively small piece of overall mortgage
debt, it was an even smaller piece of overall housing values in the U.S. at the
time, and, of course, it is an even smaller piece of the economy as a whole. So
by itself, the subprime mortgage boom was not big enough to bring down the
economy. It's only when we combine it with securitization, supersized
leverage, and excess liquidity that we get this ugly story that we are in now.
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V. BONDING BANKERS

So, here we are. What's next? Well, let's talk a little bit about the future.
First, what about nationalizing the banks? Technically, that's not the future,
it's the present because Citibank is now sixty percent owned by the
government. They just agreed to swap preferred equity for common stock. So,
the government is now a major player in Citigroup. Expect to see more of that.
Second, what about regulating financial institutions? Probably for systemic
risk purposes we are going to see an extension of safety and soundness
oversight to entities like hedge funds and private equity firms to the extent that
there's a political decision that there were important systemic consequences in
the kinds of investments involved.
Finally, let me introduce my own idea on bonding bankers. I want to tinker
with executive compensation at banks to try to reduce risk-taking by bank
managers. Let me just run through some of the steps. Bank deposit insurance
creates moral hazard. Deposit insurance effectively allows banks to take
certain kinds of risks that ordinary companies can't take. With ordinary
companies, creditors actually write contracts that include constraints on risk
taking, and those creditors monitor their borrower companies' risk taking
decisions. But banks are generally not subject to that discipline. Banks' major
creditors are their depositors. Depositors don't care about bank risk taking
because their deposits are insured. And depositors don't have contracts that
constrain bank risk taking. Banks don't have private monitors; they have
public regulators. But regulators may not be as careful about monitoring as
folks with their own money on the line.
My idea is to combine market discipline with a pay mechanism. Pay for
performance has been all the rage in the recent past. It means paying managers
with stock and other kinds of equity-based compensation, in order to align their
incentives with the stockholders' and to increase share value. This might be a
good idea for companies generally, but it's probably not a great idea for banks.
When you pay managers of banks with equity, you increase their risk-taking
incentives by giving them a direct equity stake in the upside payoff from taking
big risks. Instead, I suggest market discipline. The way to impose market
discipline is to require banks to issue publicly-traded debt securities whose
repayment is subordinated to the banks' deposit liabilities. This makes the
trading of the debt securities very sensitive to the banks' risk-taking. If we
include those securities in the pay packages of the banks' executives, they
effectively get paid for less risky performance. This gives executives a direct
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incentive to worry about risk because excessive risk-taking gets punished in
the public debt markets, which would also directly affect the wealth of the
executives through their holdings of debt securities.
So, basically that's where we are, that's where we have been, and I think,
more or less, this is where we are going.
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